Historical Background and Founding Context
Hefazat-e-Islam Bangladesh (often shortened to Hefazat) is a Deobandi Islamist advocacy group composed primarily of Qawmi madrasa (Islamic seminary) teachers and students. The organization was formed in January 2010 in Chittagong as a conservative pressure group, in reaction to government policies perceived as hostile to Islam. Its formation was reportedly triggered by the 2009 Women Development Policy draft and other secular reforms introduced by the Awami League government. Early on, Hefazat activists protested proposals to ban religion-based politics, the nullification of a constitutional amendment (the Fifth Amendment), and a new education policy that would have phased out madrasa curricula. Security forces initially impeded Hefazat’s gatherings – for example, police barred a planned rally in February 2010, briefly detaining some madrasa students. Despite these early setbacks, Hefazat quickly became prominent as a voice of hardline political Islam in Bangladesh.
In 2013, the group gained national prominence by mobilizing against the secular Shahbag movement. Hefazat leaders accused secular bloggers of “blasphemy” and led mass protests in Dhaka demanding a 13-point charter of Islamist measures. These 13 demands included instituting a blasphemy law with the death penalty, punishing “atheist bloggers,” and “stopping infiltration of all alien-culture” – a phrase encompassing what they saw as immoral or un-Islamic practices. For example, Hefazat’s 2013 manifesto called for curbing “shamelessness” under the guise of free expression and banning the “free mixing” of men and women in public, reflecting the group’s ultra-conservative stance on social and gender norms. Hefazat’s 2013 movement culminated in massive rallies (often termed the “Siege of Dhaka”), which were eventually dispersed by security forces in a controversial operation on May 5–6, 2013. These events solidified Hefazat-e-Islam as a significant Islamist force opposing Bangladesh’s secular policies.
Founders and Leadership
Hefazat-e-Islam was founded by a group of influential Islamist scholars (Ulama). The chief founder was Allama Shah Ahmad Shafi, a revered elder cleric who served as the longtime director of the Hathazari Madrasa in Chittagong. Other co-founders included Junaid Babunagari (Shafi’s deputy and a prominent madrasa teacher), Mufti Izharul Islam Chowdhury (leader of the Islami Oikya Jote party), and Abdul Malek Halim (who founded one of the first Qawmi madrasas for women). Shah Ahmad Shafi became the first Amir (supreme leader) of Hefazat and was the figurehead of the organization throughout the 2010s. Under Shafi’s leadership, Hefazat maintained a strict apolitical stance in the sense of not contesting elections, but it actively pressed its agenda through street protests and negotiations. Shafi was often addressed with the honorific “Allama” and was respected as a spiritual guide by the group’s followers.
After Shah Ahmad Shafi’s death in September 2020, the leadership passed to his protégé Junaid Babunagari. Junaid Babunagari officially became the Amir on 15 November 2020, succeeding Shafi. However, Babunagari’s tenure was short-lived – he died in August 2021 at age 67 while in office. Following Junaid Babunagari’s death, Hefazat’s top council appointed Shah Muhibbullah Babunagari as the new Amir. (Muhibbullah Babunagari, a maternal uncle of Junaid, had long been involved in the movement and provided continuity in leadership.) As of 2025, Muhibbullah Babunagari remains the Amir of Hefazat-e-Islam, steering the organization’s activities.
The administrative structure of Hefazat also includes a Secretary General and other deputies drawn from the Qawmi madrasa network. The current Secretary General is Allama Sajidur Rahman. Another notable figure is Maulana Mamunul Haque, who has served as a Joint Secretary General and is often the face of Hefazat at rallies and press conferences. Mamunul Haque became prominent for his fiery speeches and was a key organizer of many Hefazat mobilizations in the early 2020s. (He was arrested in 2021 during a crackdown on the group, reflecting the frequent clashes between Hefazat leaders and state authorities.) Hefazat’s leadership is largely drawn from the Deobandi madrasa establishment, and many senior members carry the titles of Maulana or Mufti, indicating their scholarly status in Islamic theology.
Ideology and Key Activities
Ideologically, Hefazat-e-Islam is committed to establishing a social order based on a strict interpretation of Sunni Islam (Deobandi school). The group’s very name means “Protection of Islam,” signaling its self-proclaimed mission to defend Islamic values from perceived erosion by secular or “Western” influences. Hefazat does not operate as a political party in elections; instead, it functions as a pressure group and mass movement. It wields influence through large street protests, public sermons, and negotiations with the government. The group rose to prominence by championing causes such as anti-blasphemy laws, Islamic education, conservative gender norms, and opposition to secular governance. According to its leaders, Hefazat’s activism is aimed at safeguarding Bangladesh’s Muslim majority character and countering laws or cultural changes they deem un-Islamic.
One of Hefazat’s hallmark moments was its issuance of a 13-point demand list in 2013, which encapsulates its ideology. These demands included: reinstating a Quranic preamble in the constitution, enacting a blasphemy law with capital punishment, boycotting “anti-Islamic” cultural practices, and canceling policies seen as contrary to Sharia. For instance, Hefazat called for the cancellation of the National Women Development Policy and any education reforms deemed “anti-religion,” insisting that Islamic education be mandatory at all levels. They also demanded the segregation of sexes and “proper” Islamic dress for women in public, reflecting a stance that men and women should not mix freely in society. In line with these views, Hefazat rallies often carry slogans against “westernization” and moral “corruption.” Its leaders have objected to public cultural events like Pohela Boishakh (Bengali New Year festivities) when these were seen as promoting inappropriate mingling of genders or un-Islamic traditions. In 2017, Hefazat successfully agitated for the removal of a statue of the Greek goddess Themis (Lady Justice) from the Supreme Court premises, calling the sculpture un-Islamic and a conspiracy to undermine Islamic values. The government eventually relocated the statue, a move widely viewed as a concession to Hefazat’s demands.
Hefazat-e-Islam’s activities have frequently led to stand-offs with the government. The group’s May 2013 protest in Dhaka’s Shapla Square ended with a deadly overnight security crackdown, an incident still disputed in terms of casualties. Human Rights Watch and others accused the government of excessive force, while Hefazat claimed hundreds were “martyrs” (figures not confirmed by independent sources). In later years, tensions occasionally eased; for example, the Awami League government in 2017 recognized Qawmi madrasa degrees as equivalent to general education degrees, a long-standing demand of Hefazat. Such moves were seen as the government accommodating Hefazat to neutralize opposition. However, confrontations reignited in 2021 when Hefazat led protests against Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s visit, resulting in violent clashes across several districts. Dozens died in those anti-Modi protests, after which many Hefazat leaders (including Mamunul Haque) were arrested in a government crackdown on the organization.
Despite periodic crackdowns, Hefazat’s ability to mobilize remains significant. Mass rallies are a signature tactic: for instance, in May 2025 the group staged a “Grand Rally” in Dhaka’s Suhrawardy Udyan that drew an estimated 20,000 supporters (hrw.org). At that rally, Hefazat leaders vehemently denounced a government commission’s recommendations on women’s rights, declaring that “men and women can never be equal” under Islamic law. The protesters demanded an end to what they brand “anti-Islamic” activities, explicitly including pushes for gender equality. This blend of religious populism and moral conservatism defines Hefazat’s platform: it opposes secular, liberal, or pluralistic trends in society and seeks greater influence of Sharia principles in state policy.
Anti-LGBTQ+ Stance and Activities
Hefazat-e-Islam is stridently opposed to LGBTQ+ rights, which the group’s leaders portray as part of a “Western” or immoral agenda contradicting Islamic teachings. While Bangladeshi society at large is socially conservative, Hefazat has been one of the most vocal organizations in explicitly resisting any recognition or rights for LGBTQ+ individuals. The group’s public rhetoric frequently lumps homosexuality and transgender identity together with other social ills or sins. For example, Hefazat’s leaders have claimed that legal protections for transgender people would “legalize adultery and homosexuality” in Bangladesh (dailyasianage.com). This statement came in January 2024, when the group launched a campaign to block a proposed Transgender Rights Law. In an official statement, Amir Muhibbullah Babunagari and Secretary General Sajidur Rahman demanded the government halt any law aimed at protecting transgender rights (dailyasianage.com). They argued that Islam does not recognize gender change, declaring that “one cannot become a woman from a man or vice versa just by wishing to”dailyasianage.com. Their statement warned that any transgender rights legislation would violate Sharia and “spoil moral principles and discipline” in society. In effect, Hefazat equated recognizing transgender people with promoting sexual perversion, underscoring the group’s conflation of LGBTQ identity with moral decay.
At the May 2025 Hefazat Grand Rally in Dhaka, the organization sharpened its anti-LGBTQ stance as part of its official demands. In a 12-point resolution announced at that rally, Hefazat’s leaders explicitly rejected the use of terms like “gender identity,” “gender diversity,” “gender equality,” and “third gender” in public policy. The declaration asserted that such concepts are associated with the promotion of LGBT and transgender rights, which Hefazat views as contrary to Islam. The rally’s manifesto called on the interim government to halt what Hefazat termed attempts to “institutionalize such ideologies under inclusive or non-communal slogans”. In other words, Hefazat openly framed LGBTQ+ inclusion and gender equality initiatives as part of an anti-Islamic agenda in Bangladesh. This marked one of the first times the group so directly addressed LGBTQ issues in an official charter. Hefazat supporters at the rally chanted against “third gender” recognition – Bangladesh has legally recognized a “third gender” category for hijra (transgender) people since 2013, a policy Hefazat vehemently opposes.
Beyond policy positions, Hefazat’s influence has contributed to an environment of intolerance toward LGBTQ+ people in Bangladesh. Human rights observers note that the rise of Islamist groups like Hefazat has exacerbated fears among LGBTQ communities. In late 2024, following political upheaval in the country, activists warned that empowerment of Hefazat-e-Islam and similar conservative forces could roll back the modest gains of LGBTQ+ advocacy in Bangladesh. Extremist voices aligned with Hefazat’s ideology have directly targeted LGBTQ individuals: for instance, some Islamist preachers have publicly described homosexuals as “enemies of the state and religion.” In 2016, when Islamists murdered Xulhaz Mannan – the editor of Bangladesh’s first LGBTQ magazine – militant groups justified the killing by branding Mannan’s work (promoting tolerance for homosexuality) as part of a “global war on Islam”jamestown.org. While Hefazat-e-Islam was not implicated in that act of violence, the rhetoric used by its leaders overlaps with the extremists’ narrative. Hefazat’s campaigns often claim that calls for LGBT rights are Western-imported “propaganda” aimed at undermining Islamic culture, echoing the language of more militant outfits. For example, Hefazat Amir Muhibbullah Babunagari in July 2025 protested the opening of a UN Human Rights office in Dhaka, asserting that international organizations use human rights as a pretext to “interfere with the country’s religious values”. This statement, though not explicitly about LGBTQ issues, was interpreted by observers as rejecting UN advocacy for minority rights, including LGBTQ+ rights, as unacceptable foreign influence.
In practical terms, Hefazat’s stance has meant that any attempted LGBTQ+ public events or expressions in Bangladesh have faced strong resistance. Organizers of pride-related gatherings (such as the Rainbow Rally planned during Bengali New Year celebrations in 2016) have received online threats and vitriol from Islamists, forcing such events to be canceled or held discreetly. Hefazat is part of the broader Islamist chorus that pressures authorities to shut down LGBTQ visibility. Police and government officials, in turn, often cite “public safety” to bar LGBT gatherings, implicitly conceding to the pressure from groups like Hefazat. Overall, Hefazat-e-Islam has made opposition to LGBTQ+ acceptance a core component of its vision of an Islamic society, alongside its opposition to secularism and women’s liberalization. Its public statements and protests continue to target any policy that might acknowledge sexual or gender diversity, reinforcing the ostracism of LGBTQ individuals in Bangladesh.
Political Affiliations and Influence
Although Hefazat-e-Islam is not a registered political party, it wields considerable political influence through its networks and street power. The group has often acted as a kingmaker of sorts in Bangladesh’s volatile political landscape, at times aligning (tacitly or directly) with opposition parties. The ruling Awami League has accused Hefazat of being a front for the Islamist party Jamaat-e-Islami (which was allied with the main opposition BNP). During the 2013 Shahbagh movement and subsequent elections, Awami League officials alleged that Hefazat and Jamaat-e-Islami coordinated to destabilize the government and derail the 1971 war crimes tribunals. Hefazat’s leadership denies formal links with Jamaat-e-Islami, dismissing such claims as attempts to discredit the Islamist cause. Analysts have noted that Hefazat’s founders like Ahmad Shafi came from a different strain of Islamist politics (the Deobandi madrasa tradition) that did not collaborate with Pakistan in 1971, unlike Jamaat. Despite this distinction, Hefazat’s street agitations often dovetailed with the goals of the BNP-Jamaat opposition. For example, in 2013 the BNP publicly supported Hefazat’s right to protest and condemned the government’s crackdown on Hefazat demonstrators. In the eyes of many observers, Hefazat provided a religiously charged mass movement that the opposition leveraged against the secular ruling party.
International observers have also taken note of Hefazat’s role. In 2014, the European Parliament identified Hefazat-e-Islam as a “main instigator” of political violence alongside Jamaat-e-Islami, urging Bangladesh’s opposition BNP to unequivocally distance itself from both groups (thedailystar.net). The European Parliament’s resolution warned that parties associated with terrorist acts should be banned – a clear reference to Jamaat and Hefazat in the context of deadly protests and attacks on minorities around Bangladesh’s 2014 national election. This was a significant international rebuke, painting Hefazat as an extremist splinter force in national politics. Domestically, the Awami League government has alternated between crackdowns and concessions in dealing with Hefazat. Following the 2013 and 2021 violent episodes, many Hefazat leaders were arrested and charged in criminal cases (for arson, vandalism, etc.). Yet at other times, the government quietly met some of Hefazat’s demands – such as removing controversial textbooks passages, or the 2017 removal of the Lady Justice statue mentioned earlier – in order to appease the group and prevent further unrest. This dual approach underscores Hefazat’s leverage: the government must calculate the risks of confronting a movement that can mobilize tens of thousands of devout followers on short notice.
Since mid-2024, Hefazat-e-Islam appears to have gained unprecedented political space under Bangladesh’s interim administration. In August 2024, Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina was ousted amid nationwide protests, and an interim government led by former UN official Dr. Muhammad Yunus took charge. This interim regime has included or courted various Islamist and right-wing groups. Reports indicate that the interim government has formed strong ties with Hefazat-e-Islam, as well as Jamaat-e-Islami and other Islamist factions. Notably, one of the new government’s moves was lifting a ban on Jamaat-e-Islami (previously outlawed by Hasina’s government). Hefazat’s leaders have capitalized on this moment by pressing their agenda more forcefully – for instance, immediately calling for the dissolution of the Women’s Affairs Commission and threatening nationwide agitation if their demands are not met. With the Awami League out of power (at least temporarily), Hefazat’s relationship with the state has shifted. The current regime has shown willingness to engage with Hefazat: several Hefazat-aligned scholars and activists who were jailed under the previous government have been released without charges, and pending cases against Hefazat members are being withdrawn. This suggests that Hefazat is effectively being “mainstreamed” as a stakeholder by the interim authorities. While this empowerment pleases Hefazat’s base, human rights groups have voiced alarm that it bodes ill for liberal governance and minority rights. There is concern that Hefazat’s influence on the interim government could translate into policy regression on issues like gender equality and freedom of expression, given the group’s hardline stances.
In terms of broader alliances, Hefazat maintains links with a constellation of Islamist platforms. It is part of the Deobandi movement and has ideological kinship with groups like Khelafat Majlish and Islami Andolan Bangladesh, which also seek greater enforcement of Sharia. Hefazat has cooperated with these parties on occasion during rallies or Hartal (strike) calls on religious issues. However, Hefazat positions itself as an independent movement of the Qawmi madrasas, often asserting it has no partisan agenda beyond Islam. This claim was somewhat tested when internal rifts emerged in late 2020: after Ahmad Shafi’s death, there were reports of factional infighting between more hardline and relatively moderate camps within Hefazat. The hardline faction (loyal to Junaid Babunagari) ultimately took control, which coincided with a sharper anti-government tone and the anti-Modi protests of 2021. Overall, Hefazat’s political influence is felt less through formal alliances and more through its capacity to swing the street sentiment. Any government in Bangladesh, whether Awami League or BNP-led, must reckon with Hefazat when formulating policies touching on religion, social norms, or education.
Official Website and Social Media Presence
Hefazat-e-Islam maintains an official website (in Bengali) and is active on social media as a means of outreach. The official website, hefazateislam.com, provides updates on the organization’s announcements, ideology, and press releases. Content on the site emphasizes the history of the movement and its goals of establishing Islamic governance in Bangladesh. For instance, the site describes Hefazat as a Qawmi madrasa-based organization formed in 2010 to carry out an Islamist movement for establishing Sharia governance in the country. The website often publishes statements from the Amir and press statements on current issues (such as rebuttals to government policies or clarifications of Hefazat’s positions).
On social media, Hefazat’s primary outlet is Facebook. The group’s official Facebook page (simply named “Hefazat-e-Islam Bangladesh”) has a substantial following – on the order of seventy two of thousands+ of followers – and is updated frequently. Posts typically include event announcements, photos and videos of rallies, and religious messages from Hefazat leaders. The Facebook page serves to mobilize supporters by advertising protests or prayer gatherings, and it often livestreams important speeches (for example, Friday sermons by senior Hefazat scholars). The tone of Hefazat’s social media is closely moderated to reflect its conservative values; the page welcomes its audience with Islamic greetings and refrains from any imagery deemed inappropriate. Beyond Facebook, some Hefazat-aligned scholars or madrasa students use YouTube and local video-sharing platforms to disseminate sermons and recitations. However, Hefazat as an organization does not appear to have an official presence on Twitter or Instagram, likely focusing instead on platforms popular with its constituency. It also relies on traditional networks – mosques, madrasas, and local religious gatherings – to spread messages, which often then circulate on messaging apps like WhatsApp.
Notably, Hefazat’s media presence sometimes runs into friction with authorities. During crackdowns (such as in March 2021), the government temporarily blocked Facebook access nationwide, reportedly to curb Hefazat’s ability to coordinate and spread protest footage. Despite these challenges, Hefazat continues to leverage the internet to rally support. The organization’s communications style is generally in Bengali, reflecting its focus on grassroots Bangladeshi audiences rather than international PR. For researchers and observers, the Hefazat-e-Islam website and Facebook page provide direct insight into the group’s current narratives – from denouncements of global events (like conflicts in the Middle East) to domestic campaigns against liberal reforms. These online platforms have effectively extended Hefazat’s reach beyond the madrasa courtyards into the digital space, helping maintain the movement’s cohesion and public visibility.
Sources:
Hefazat-e-Islam Bangladesh – Wikipedia (en.wikipedia.org)
“Hefazat-e-Islam opposes enacting transgender rights law.” The Asian Age. Jan 6, 2024 (dailyasianage.com)
“2025 Hefazat Grand Rally” – Wikipedia (Declaration excerpts) (en.wikipedia.org)
Human Rights Watch – “Bangladeshi Women’s Rights Opposed by Hardline Religious Groups.” May 5, 2025 (hrw.org)
AP News – “Thousands of Islamists rally in Bangladesh against proposed changes to women’s rights.” May 3, 2025 (apnews.com)
Jamestown Foundation – “Diverging Trajectories in Bangladesh: Islamic State vs al-Qaeda.” Dec 2017 (jamestown.org) (context on extremist narratives)
The Daily Star – “Delink with Jamaat.” Jan 18, 2014 (thedailystar.net)
Junaid Babunagari – Wikipedia (leadership succession) (en.wikipedia.org)